A note on continuously decomposed evolving exchange economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A note on continuously decomposed evolving exchange economies
It is routine to demonstrate in the exchange economy framework that small changes of individual preferences and endowments always result in small changes of the derived excess demand functions as one should expect. Though being as desirable for reasons of the consistency of the whole approach, however, a precise proof of the converse direction so far is still open to question. The present paper...
متن کاملA Note on Civilizations and Economies
This article approaches the topic of civilizations and economies through a discussion of two key texts that appeared during the first wave of interest among social scientists for the phenomenon of civilization: ‘Note on the Notion of Civilization’ ([1913] 1998) by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, and ‘Author’s Introduction’ ([1920a] 1930) by Max Weber. Durkheim and Mauss were of the opinion tha...
متن کاملNote on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
In this paper we show that in pure exchange economies there exists no Pareto efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism which ensures positive consumptions to all agents. We also show that Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy allocation mechanism is dictatorial. We further show that if there exists three agents, then the allocation given by a Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, ...
متن کاملA Note on Stream Ciphers that Continuously Use the IV
Time-memory-data tradeoff (TMD-TO) attacks limit the security level of many classical stream ciphers (like E0, A5/1, Trivium, Grain) to n/2, where n denotes the inner state length of the underlying keystream generator. This implies that to withstand TMD tradeoff attacks, the state size should be at least double the key size. In 2015, Armknecht and Mikhalev introduced a new line of research, whi...
متن کاملNote on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
In this note we show that in a pure exchange economy with two agents and a finite number of goods, there exists no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nondictatorial social choice allocation function on any local Cobb-Douglas preference domain. This is a slight extension of a result proved by Hashimoto (2008).
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Central European Journal of Operations Research
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1435-246X,1613-9178
DOI: 10.1007/s10100-006-0005-8