A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at mos...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1306579