A New Perspective: Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Energy Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0195-6574
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.1.rpou