A New Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support

Abstract In this paper I identify a family of explanatory demands facing permissivists, those who deny the uniqueness thesis, according to which every body evidence rationally permits exactly one doxastic attitude for person have in light that evidence. Call pair and proposition permissive case just there is more than permitted someone has take proposition. Uniquers claim are no cases, permissivists this. The thesis strong claim, vulnerable counterexamples because it universal generalization, indeed, many argue their view by identifying putative thesis. However, virtue advancing these counterexamples, incur demands. If some, but not all, cases then owe us an explanation why some others not. Likewise, each case, must explain attitudes towards Permissivists draw arbitrary lines between impermissive impermitted attitudes, giving rise distinctions need explaining. shall cannot discharge burdens satisfying way. After carefully presenting section 2, consider how might answer them 3. only able successfully extreme like subjective Bayesians. Most philosophers, however, will find epistemological outlook implausible contains substantive constraints on rational belief. also show previous attempts merely relocate, rather answer, identified. final argues soften up demands, either. permissivist appeal vagueness notion or attitude's being permitted, order make line appear less arbitrary. Nor, argue, can hold our ignorance permissive, they are, lessens face. Unfortunately, been most interested attempting counterexample concerned with so doing. my arguments successful, then, permissivism much plausible currently given credit for, and, at very least, lot work do further articulating generalizing as provide adequate scope epistemic permission.