A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

Abstract We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) its rebuttal by Formosa Ryan 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither essay nor Ryan’s is explicitly framed within teachings specific school. The former appeals to lack “both empirical intuitive support” (Van 2019, p. 721) AMAs, latter opts “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning provide “the essential groundwork making an all things considered judgment regarding moral case building AMAs” (Formosa pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may benefit their acceptability, it also detract from rootedness, coherence, persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed distinctive philosophical anthropology worldview, summoned fill gap as standard test these two opposing claims. It provides substantive account agency through theory voluntary action; explains how action tied intelligent autonomous human life; distinguishes machine operations actions categories poiesis praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while be right in rejecting there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing defense call nuanced context-dependent approach, similar practical wisdom, becomes expedient.