منابع مشابه
The Conceivability Argument for Dualism
I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis. Identity theorists have been concerned with several distinct types of identifications: of a person with his body, of a particular sensation (or event or state of having the sensation) with a particular brain state (Jones's pain at 06:00 was his C-fiber stimulation at that t...
متن کاملNon-Cartesian Substance Dualism
ions from the overall psychology of a person. Thus, for instance, the notion of a will without an intellect, or of a language module in the absence of belief and desire, is just plain nonsense. Finally, it will not do to speak of the self ’s psychological states and processes themselves—its beliefs, intentions, experiences, and so forth—as being ‘parts,’ much less as being substantial parts, of...
متن کاملSubstance Dualism or Eliminativism
Physicalism (P) entails minimal physicalism (MP), MP entails minimal supervenience (MS), and MS is the thesis that there is covariance between the supervenient and the subvenient stuff. Therefore, if the (alleged) supervenient and subvenient stuff do not covary, then MS is false, and if MS is false then MP is false, and if MP is false then P is false. Put differently: if MS is false then P is f...
متن کاملA Quantum-mechanical Argument for Mind–body Dualism
I argue that a strong mind–body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind–body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical–physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis...
متن کاملConsciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism
There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the American Philosophical Association
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2053-4477,2053-4485
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2015.10