A Monotonic Weighted Banzhaf Value for Voting Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The aim of this paper is to extend the classical Banzhaf index power voting games in which players have weights representing different cooperation or bargaining abilities. obtained value does not satisfy total property, justified by imperfect cooperation. Nevertheless, it monotonous weights. We also obtain three characterizations value. Then we relate Owen multilinear extension.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2227-7390']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/math9121343