A minimax theorem for zero-sum stopping games in dynamic fuzzy systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Zero-Sum Games: Minimax Equilibria
Matching Pennies is a well-known example of a two player, zero-sum game. In this game, each of the players, the matcher and the mismatcher, flips a coin, and the payoffs are determined as follows. If the coins come up matching (i.e., both heads or both tails), then the matcher wins, so the mismatcher pays the matcher the sum of $1. If the coins do not match (i.e., one head and one tail), then t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical and Computer Modelling
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0895-7177
DOI: 10.1016/s0895-7177(99)00015-1