A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA FOR EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism

In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.

Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories

‘Epistemic’ theories of vagueness notoriously claim that (despite the appearances to the contrary) all of our vague terms have sharp boundaries; it’s just that we can’t know what they are. Epistemic theories are typically criticized for failing to explain (1) the source of the ignorance postulated, and (2) how our terms could come to have such precise boundaries. Both of these objections will, ...

Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind

Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism

1. Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a b...

Metaphilosophical Criteria for Worldview Comparison

Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill this gap, we introduce nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in three broad categories: objective criteria (objective consistency, scientificity, scope) subjective criteria (subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality) and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narr...