A look upstream: Market restructuring, risk, procurement contracts and efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.007