A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate (precise) states of affairs obtain...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Philosophical Quarterly
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0031-8094,1467-9213
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqx015