A group identification account of collective epistemic vices

Abstract This paper offers an account of collective epistemic vices, which we call the “group identification account”. The group attributes vices to groups that are constituted by identification”, is a primitive and non-doxastic self-understanding as member (Turner, 1982; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Pacherie, 2013; Salice Miyazono, 2020). distinctive feature it enables us attribute not just established social (e.g. committees, research teams, juries) but also loose loosely connected people in echo chamber) when they identification. contrasted with Fricker’s (2010, 2020) influential account, “joint commitment account”, focuses on groups, has difficulty making sense groups. motivated fact can be useful diagnose only performance real-life cases, such chamber (Nguyen, 2020), implicit bias (Holroyd, polarization (Broncano-Berrocal Carter, 2021), etc.