A graph-theoretic network security game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1754-8632,1754-8640
DOI: 10.1504/ijaacs.2008.021488