منابع مشابه
Using the Core to Predict Coalition Formation
The main objective of this work is to use the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two non-cooperative procedures that deliver a natural and non-empty core extension, the aspiration core (Cross 1967, Bennett 1983), together with the supporting coalitions it implies. ...
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It has been debated whether the Global Fund (GF), which is supporting the implementation of programs on the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, should consider the value-for-money (VFM) for programs/interventions that they are supporting. In this paper, we critically analyze the uses of economic information for GF programs, not only to ensure accountability to the...
متن کاملCore in a simple coalition formation game
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which gua...
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هدف اصلی از این تحقیق به دست آوردن و مقایسه حق بیمه باورمندی در مدل های شمارشی گزارش نشده برای داده های طولی می باشد. در این تحقیق حق بیمه های پبش گویی بر اساس توابع ضرر مربع خطا و نمایی محاسبه شده و با هم مقایسه می شود. تمایل به گرفتن پاداش و جایزه یکی از دلایل مهم برای گزارش ندادن تصادفات می باشد و افراد برای استفاده از تخفیف اغلب از گزارش تصادفات با هزینه پائین خودداری می کنند، در این تحقیق ...
15 صفحه اولThe gamma-core and coalition formation
This paper reinterprets the γ -core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279–293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/543179a