A Game of One/Two Strategic Friendly Jammers Versus a Malicious Strategic Node
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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The Firefighter Problem was proposed in 1995 [25] as a deterministic discrete-time model for the spread and containment of a fire. The problem is defined on an undirected finite graph G = (V,E), where initially fire breaks out at f nodes. In each subsequent time-step, two actions occur: A certain number b of firefighters are placed on nonburning nodes, permanently protecting them from the fire....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Networking Letters
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2576-3156
DOI: 10.1109/lnet.2019.2893536