A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming

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A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming

In combinatorial auctions, buyers and sellers bid not only for single items but also for combinations (or “bundles,” or “baskets”) of items. Clearing the auction is in general an NP-hard problem; it is usually solved with integer linear programming. We proposed in an earlier paper a continuous approximation of this problem, where orders are aggregated and integrality constraints are relaxed. It...

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Fu-Shiung Hsieh # Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Chaoyang University of Technology Taiwan, R.O.C. [email protected] Abstract—We formulate group buying problem as a combinatorial reverse auction problem with multiple buyers and multiple sellers. We propose the concept of proxy buyer to deal with this problem. The proxy buyer consolidates the demands from the buyers...

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Online group-buying is one of the most innovative business models employed by many companies. From the perspective of buyers, quantity based discounts provide a huge incentive to form coalitions and take advantage of lower prices without ordering more than their actual demand. Traditional group-buying mechanisms are usually based on a single item and uniform cost sharing. One way to reduce the ...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences

سال: 2005

ISSN: 1173-9126,1532-7612

DOI: 10.1155/jamds.2005.19