A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct∗
We study self-referential games in which players can perfectly understand an opponent’s strategy, which is referred to as a code of conduct. We show a folk theorem for finite normal form games. We also provide an application of codes of conduct: games that are played through computer programs.
متن کاملFolk theorem with communication
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [6] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-pl...
متن کاملthe relationship of wtc with communication apprehension and self-perceived communication competene in english and persian context
بیشتر تحقیقات پیشین در زمینه تمایل به برقراری ارتباط به رابطه آن با عوامل فردی چون سن، جنس، نوع شخصیت و... صورت گرفته است. در صورتی که مطالعات کمتری به بررسی رابطه تمایل به برقراری ارتباط زبان آموزان فارسی زبان با ترس از برقراری ارتباط و توانش خود ادراکانه آنها در برقراری ارتباط در محیط فارسی و انگلیسی انجام شده است. بر اساس نظریه الیس (2008) تمایل به برقراری ارتباط جایگاه مهمی در زمینه آموزش م...
15 صفحه اولa comparison of teachers and supervisors, with respect to teacher efficacy and reflection
supervisors play an undeniable role in training teachers, before starting their professional experience by preparing them, at the initial years of their teaching by checking their work within the proper framework, and later on during their teaching by assessing their progress. but surprisingly, exploring their attributes, professional demands, and qualifications has remained a neglected theme i...
15 صفحه اولA commitment folk theorem
Real world players often increase their payo¤s by voluntarily committing to play a xed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further bene t from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that uni es earlier models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models. A commi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2196-1085,2196-1093
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0107-y