منابع مشابه
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Dutta (1995) studies dynamic stochastic games with finite states, and proves a folk theorem that holds as players become very patient (so that players discount vanishingly little both the time until the next period and the expected time until the next state transition). Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011) extend that analysis to the case of imperfect ...
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We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name “minority game”). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announc...
متن کاملThe Folk Theorem for Repeated Games
The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU "non-equivalent utilities". The condition is weak, easily interpreted, ...
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We consider repeated games on a social network: each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts and communicates. The payoff of a player depends only on the actions chosen by himself and his neighbors, and at each stage, a player can send different messages to his neighbors. Players observe their stage payoff but not the actions chosen by their neighbors. We establish a necessary and ...
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We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players’) equilibrium payoffs is independent of the state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1995.1030