A finite characterization of perfect equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs). Their was essentially finite in that they showed there exists bound on the number levels LPS, but did not compute it explicitly. In this note, we draw two recent developments Real Algebraic Geometry to obtain formula for bound.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Programming
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0025-5610', '1436-4646']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01746-8