A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms that decide, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0962-8452,1471-2954
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2020.2630