A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

سال: 2010

ISSN: 1058-6407,1530-9134

DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00245.x