A Double Auction Mechanism to Allocate and Price the Network Resource

The Progressive Second Price Auction Mechanism for Network Resource Sharing

In the emerging multiservice communication networks (ATM, Next-Generation Internet), traditional approaches to pricing are not viable. In telephony, the resources allocated to a call are xed, and usage prices are based on the predictability of the number of active calls at any given moment. But the wide and rapidly evolving range of applications (including some which adapt to resource availabil...

A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equil...

A Combinatorial Auction to Allocate Traffic

Price Discovery Using a Double Auction

We investigate equilibrium in the buyer’s bid double auction (BBDA) in a model with correlated signals and either private or interdependent values. Using a combination of theorems and numerical experiments, we demonstrate that simple equilibria exist even in small markets. Moreover, we bound traders’ strategic behavior as a function of market size and derive rates of convergence to zero of (i) ...

A distributed auction-based algorithm to allocate bandwidth over paths

In the literature, Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) double-sided auctions have been applied to inter-domain traffic exchange because they provide incentives to be truthful and lead to an efficient use of the network, among relevant properties of mechanism design. Unfortunately, the resulting resource allocation scheme is neither budget-balanced nor solvable in a decentralized way, two important prope...