A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory

A Double Auction Market: Teaching, Experiment, and Theory By

Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction

In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with...

Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complex...

Design of a Multi-Unit Double Auction E-Market

We envision a future economy where e-markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Future e-markets should be designed to be robust to manipulation, flexible, and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. One of the most important aspects of designing an e-market is market mechanism design. A market mechanism defines the organization, information exc...

Revenue Maximization in a Bayesian Double Auction Market

We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. We consider a Bayesian setting where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions on the values of products on the market. For the simplest setting where each seller has one kind of item that can be sold in whole to a bu...