A Differentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Undergraduates Compute Pure Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.235279