A DEA model for measuring financial intermediation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Intermediation
The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in capital markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities. The prices o...
متن کاملImplementing E cient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation
In a nite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante e cient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modi ed by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-...
متن کاملFinancial Intermediation in a Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction
This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is ...nanced by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher’s moral hazard. It is shown that ...nancial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the ...nancial sector may have larger growth e¤ects than a direct subsidy to researc...
متن کاملComparing in Financial Intermediation
We explain informed capital by showing that projects can be screened by comparing loan applicants. Because efficient comparing requires centralized monitoring, it represents a novel rationale for financial intermediation. Positive scale effects may make a single monopoly intermediary optimal. Comparing can also eliminate the problems of adverse selection and inefficient investments.
متن کاملFinancial Intermediation Networks∗
We study a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which interbank lending is subject to moral hazard, where intermediaries can divert funds towards inefficient projects. We show that despite the presence of moral hazard, secured lending contracts can discipline the investment choices of all market participants — even those with whom they are not directly contracting — thus partially overc...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Change and Restructuring
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1573-9414,1574-0277
DOI: 10.1007/s10644-020-09281-w