A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of indivisible Objects
We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198909002273