منابع مشابه
W . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful domain which guarantees the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions. A social choice function is shown to be anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on single-crossing domains if and onl...
متن کاملW . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when office utility from cabinet positions is ...
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I t all started when Nathan Allen was stuck in the lab, babysitting his experiments for hours at a time. The 10or 15-minute blocks between checking on his reactions weren’t long enough to dig into anything substantial. Instead, he recalls, “I posted snarky comments on the internet, which you can do in 5 minutes.” Soon, Allen was answering science questions on the Web site Reddit, where he saw p...
متن کاملW . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER A Reputational
We study a dynamic game of incomplete information in which two political parties contest elections with endogenously formed reputations regarding the preferences that prevail within each party. Party preferences exhibit serial correlation and change with higher probability following defeat in elections. We show that when partisans care sufficiently about office, extreme policies are pursued wit...
متن کاملW . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER Endogeneous Firm Objectives
We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm’s decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on v...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Statistical Science
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0883-4237
DOI: 10.1214/ss/1177011818