A comparison of non-transferable utility values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sergiu Hart a Comparison of Non-transferable Utility
Three values for non-transferable utility games – the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler–Owen consistent NTU-value – are compared in a simple example.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-5633-7