A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coalitional Voting Manipulation: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
Computational social choice literature has successfully studied the complexity of manipulation in various voting systems. However, the existing models of coalitional manipulation view the manipulating coalition as an exogenous input, ignoring the question of the coalition formation process. While such analysis is useful as a first approximation, a richer framework is required to model voting ma...
متن کاملPartitioning of Large-Scale Systems using Game-Theoretic Coalitional Methods*
In this paper, tools from cooperative game theory are combined with predictive control to perform the partitioning of large-scale systems (LSS). More specifically, a partitioning algorithm based on the Shapley value to rank the links by using a cooperative cost game is proposed. To this end, coalitional model predictive control, which offers a trade-off between control performance and communica...
متن کاملCOALITIONAL GAME WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS AND CREDIBILISTIC SHAPLEY VALUE
Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiencesand subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theo...
متن کاملGame-theoretic Model of Computation
The present paper introduces an intrinsic notion of “(effective) computability” in game semantics motivated by the fact that strategies in game semantics have been defined recursive if they are “computable in an extrinsic sense”, i.e., they are representable by partial recursive functions, and so it has been difficult to regard game semantics as an autonomous foundation of computation. As a con...
متن کاملA Game-Theoretic Model of Metaphorical Bargaining
We present a game-theoretic model of bargaining over a metaphor in the context of political communication, find its equilibrium, and use it to rationalize observed linguistic behavior. We argue that game theory is well suited for modeling discourse as a dynamic resulting from a number of conflicting pressures, and suggest applications of interest to computational linguists.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y