A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Refinements of subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in games with perfect information
We consider games with perfect information and deterministic transitions. A common solution concept is the concept of subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, where ε ≥ 0, which is a strategy profile such that no player can improve his payoff in any subgame by more than ε. We propose and examine a number of refinements of this concept. A major emphasis lies on existence results. Roughly speaking, the mos...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2016.0843