A characterization of stochastically stable networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A characterization of stochastically stable networks
Jackson and Watts (J Econ Theory 71: 44–74, 2002) have examined the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise stability, p-pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable networks without requiring the “tree construction” and the computation of resistance that may be quite complex. When a 1 2 -pairwise stable networ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.882802