A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting∗
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the firstperiod proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in th...
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15 صفحه اولIncentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick.
Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evolution leads...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012