A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Low-Risk Mechanisms for the Kidney Exchange Game
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et al. [1] present a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for this problem. This is the best known result in this setting with multiple players. However,...
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ارزش در معرض ریسک یکی از مهمترین معیارهای اندازه گیری ریسک در بنگاه های اقتصادی می باشد. برآورد دقیق ارزش در معرض ریسک موضوع بسیارمهمی می باشد و انحراف از آن می تواند موجب ورشکستگی و یا عدم تخصیص بهینه منابع یک بنگاه گردد. هدف اصلی این مطالعه بررسی کارایی روش copula-garch شرطی در برآورد ارزش در معرض ریسک پرتفویی متشکل از دو سهام می باشد و ارزش در معرض ریسک بدست آمده با روشهای سنتی برآورد ارزش د...
Two-Player Kidney Exchange Game
Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. T...
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Transplantation is the preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease; deceaseddonor and live-donor kidneys are the two sources for transplantation, and these sources are utilized via two different programs. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patient-donor couples, for each of whom transplantation from donor to intended recipient is not...
متن کاملAn Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism
We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement over a recent upper bound of 2 [Ashlagi e...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2017.12.029