A Bilateral River Bargaining Problem with Negative Externality

Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information

We study the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information. We consider a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers. One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can either be Low or High. The other seller’s reservation price is commonly known to be in between the Low and High values of the privately-informed seller. Buyers...

Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information

This paper studies a dynamic matching market with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting at the rate r and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and su cient condition on parameters for no market breakdown is obtained. This condition is the same regardle...

Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information1

We study the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information. We consider a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers. One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can either be Low or High. The other seller’s reservation price is commonly known to be in between the Low and High values of the privately-informed seller. Buyers...

A Differential Oligopoly Game with Sticky Prices and Environmental Externality

The Bargaining Problem

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