A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to proposer who made offer. It shown then, classic result of Shaked that, in multilateral version this game, every division good can be sustained SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs unique. The further leads responder advantage.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2073-4336']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040087