5G Price Competition with Social Equilibrium Optimality for Social Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
Due to the leaps of progress in 5G telecommunication industry, commodity pricing and consumer choice are frequently subject change competition search for optimal supply demand. We here utilize a two-stage extensive game with complete information mathematically describe user-supplier interactions on social network. Firstly, an example how apply our model practical wireless system is shown. Then we build prototype that offers multiple services users provides different outputs suppliers, where addition, user supplier quantities independently distributed. Secondly, then consider scenario which wish maximize welfare determine if there perfect answer. seek subgame Nash equilibrium show it exists, also when both sides reach it, likewise reaches its maximum. Finally, provide numerical results corroborate efficacy approach background.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied sciences
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2076-3417']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/app12178798