5G Price Competition with Social Equilibrium Optimality for Social Networks

نویسندگان

چکیده

Due to the leaps of progress in 5G telecommunication industry, commodity pricing and consumer choice are frequently subject change competition search for optimal supply demand. We here utilize a two-stage extensive game with complete information mathematically describe user-supplier interactions on social network. Firstly, an example how apply our model practical wireless system is shown. Then we build prototype that offers multiple services users provides different outputs suppliers, where addition, user supplier quantities independently distributed. Secondly, then consider scenario which wish maximize welfare determine if there perfect answer. seek subgame Nash equilibrium show it exists, also when both sides reach it, likewise reaches its maximum. Finally, provide numerical results corroborate efficacy approach background.

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Monopolistic competition Equilibrium and optimality*

Since the publication of Chamberlin's book [The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933)], there has been sorne controversy about what is implied by adopting the Monopolistic Competition point of view [see for example Stigler (1968, p. 320) vs. Samuelson (1958)]. The first formal model of Monopolistic Competition is due to Spence (1976). He showed that if the utility function of the sole consu...

متن کامل

Local Nash Equilibrium in Social Networks

Nash equilibrium is widely present in various social disputes. As of now, in structured static populations, such as social networks, regular, and random graphs, the discussions on Nash equilibrium are quite limited. In a relatively stable static gaming network, a rational individual has to comprehensively consider all his/her opponents' strategies before they adopt a unified strategy. In this s...

متن کامل

A centralized privacy-preserving framework for online social networks

There are some critical privacy concerns in the current online social networks (OSNs). Users' information is disclosed to different entities that they were not supposed to access. Furthermore, the notion of friendship is inadequate in OSNs since the degree of social relationships between users dynamically changes over the time. Additionally, users may define similar privacy settings for their f...

متن کامل

Social Preferences and Competition

There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely selfinterested. We qualify this view. Social preferences are irrelevant if and only if two conditions are met: separability of preferences ...

متن کامل

Social Stability and Equilibrium

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Applied sciences

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2076-3417']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/app12178798