527 Groups and Campaign Finance: The Language, Logic, and Landscape of Campaign Finance Regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Candidates, Groups, and the Campaign Finance Environment
More than 300 presidential candidates have alerted the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that they plan to seek the nation's highest office in 2016. Few would be widely regarded as major candidates, and some undeclared candidates have nonetheless received substantial media attention. According to one recent media report, "[f]ifteen White House contenders are being boosted by big-money groups ru...
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Recent controversies in campaign finance have generated concerns that wealthy donors will dominate the political landscape, with Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission2 standing as the high-water marks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudential turn towards deregulation. This short Essay puts this case law in perspective by briefly explain...
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Previous research suggests that female candidates do not face fundraising barriers; however, female politicians consistently report that fundraising is more difficult for them than their male colleagues. Using a regression discontinuity design to hold district characteristics constant, we study whether there is a gender gap in campaign fundraising for state legislators from 1990 to 2010. We fin...
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Efforts to limit political contributions and spending are extremely popular. Yet there is no serious evidence that campaign finance regulation has achieved or will achieve its goals of reducing the influence of money, opening up the political system, and lowering the cost of campaigns. Indeed, since the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, spending has risen sharply, the number...
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In a recent Stanford Law Review article, Ayres and Bulow [1] propose a radical anonymity-based solution to disrupt the “market” for monetary influence in political campaigns. To realize their proposal, we propose new cryptographic protocols for commital deniable proofs and deniable payment schemes. “[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.798984