2018 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections: Political Dowry and Policy Implication

Political Competition in Legislative Elections∗

We develop a theory of candidate nomination processes predicated upon the notion that members of the majority party in a legislature collaboratively influence policy. Because of this team aspect, a candidate’s party label matters for voters, in addition to his own policy positions: For example, in a liberal district, electing even a liberal Republican may be unattractive for voters because it i...

Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining

The key theoretical idea in this paper is that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. These resources are then used by a party to enhance the leader’s valence — the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, will balance a centripetal ...

Political disagreement and information in elections

We study the role of re-election concerns in the incentives of incumbent parties to engage in policy experimentation. In a probabilistic voting model, candidates representing two groups of voters compete for o ce. In equilibrium, the candidate representing the majority group wins with a probability that increases in the degree of political disagreement — the di↵erence in expected payo↵s from th...

Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles

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Global Happiness Policy Synthesis 2018